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ECAUSE 2002 was not a legislative year in Texas, the bulk of this
Survey discusses cases decided during 2002 under the Uniform
Commercial Code as contained in the Texas Business and Com-
merce Code (the "Code").1 During this time period, however, the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
approved a complete revision of the general provisions contained in Arti-
cle 1 of the Code and submitted this revision to the several states for
possible enactment. Because revised Article 1 may be considered during
the 2003 Texas legislative session, this Survey discusses some of the more
important changes made by this revision.2
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. CONSPICUOUSNESS
In Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum,3 the Texas Supreme Court
held that the Code standard for conspicuousness was to be applied to all
contracts, whether or not the particular contract otherwise involved a
subject covered by the Code. 4 This standard was applied in American In-
* Professor of Law and Foundation Professor of Commercial Law, Texas Tech Uni-
versity. B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; L.L.M., Harvard University. The author wishes to
acknowledge the assistance of Ana Krahmer in the preparation of this article.
1. The Texas enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code is contained in the first
eleven chapters of the Code. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Vernon
1994, 2002 & Supp. 2003). These chapters are designated as follows:
Chapter 1: General Provisions
Chapter 2: Sales
Chapter 2A: Leases
Chapter 3: Negotiable Instruments
Chapter 4: Bank Deposits and Collections
Chapter 4A: Funds Transfers
Chapter 5: Letters of Credit
Chapter 7: Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading and Other Documents of Title
Chapter 8: Investment Securities
Chapter 9: Secured Transactions; Sales of Accounts and Chattel Paper
Chapter 10: (reserved for Expansion)
Chapter 11: Effective Date and Transition Provision-1973 Amendments
2. See infra note 18.
3. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1993).
4. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(10) (Vernon 1994) provides that "[a] term
or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to
operate ought to have noticed it .... Whether a term or clause is 'conspicuous' or not is for
decision by the court."
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demnity Lloyds v. Travelers Property & Casualty Co. 5 to determine if an
indemnity provision in a contract between a general contractor and a sub-
contractor was "conspicuous" so as to require the subcontractor to in-
demnify the general contractor for injuries suffered by an employee that
arose out of work covered by the subcontract. The court held that be-
cause the indemnity provision was separately numbered and appeared on
the face of the contract without being hidden by a misleading heading or
surrounded by unrelated terms, it was "conspicuous" as a matter of law.6
Similarly, in Ranger Insurance Co. v. American International Specialty
Lines Insurance Co., 7 the Houston Court of Appeals applied the Code
standard to conclude that indemnity terms in an oil field drilling contract
were "conspicuous" where the terms appeared on the face of a footage
drilling contract in separately numbered paragraphs under a heading
printed in bold, capital letters in a slightly larger font size. 8 The court
also noted that the indemnity terms were not contained within a group of
unrelated terms, but were contained in the paragraphs dealing with the
subject matters covered by the general heading.9
B. ACCELERATION CLAUSES
Section 1.208 of the Code permits terms allowing the acceleration of
payment or performance "at will," provided that the acceleration is done
in the good faith belief that the prospect of payment or performance is
impaired.10 A continuing issue under Texas law is determining the rela-
tionship between an acceleration clause and a usury savings clause. This
issue is critical because a lender commits usury under Texas law by con-
tracting for, charging, or receiving interest in an amount greater than that
allowed by law." Whether a savings clause prevented a contract from
being usurious on its face when the same contract also contained an ac-
celeration clause that could result in the charging of excess interest was
addressed in In re Auto International Refrigeration.12 The court reasoned
that the mere possibility that an acceleration clause might result in the
charge of excess, unearned interest would not make a contract usurious
on its face if a savings clause limited the amount of interest to the maxi-
5. Am. Indem. Lloyds v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D. Tex.
2002).
6. Id. at 634-35.
7. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 659 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
8. Id. at 665. The heading of the indemnity provisions read, "RESPONSIBILITY
FOR LOSS OR DAMAGE, INDEMNITY, RELEASE OF LIABILITY AND ALLO-
CATION OF RISK." Id.
9. Id.
10. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.208 (Vernon 1994). Section 3.106 makes it
clear that the negotiability of an instrument is not affected by the inclusion of an accelera-
tion clause. Id. at § 3.106.
11. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.001 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
12. In re Auto Int'l Refrigeration, 275 B.R. 789 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
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mum allowed by Texas law. 13 It should be noted that this result seems to
be in conflict with the conclusion reached in Armstrong v. Steppes Apart-
ments, Ltd.,14 where a note contained both an acceleration clause and a
savings clause. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the savings
clause did not prevent the note from being facially usurious because the
clause was directly contrary to the explicit terms of the note.15 Arm-
strong has been criticized for failing to explain why the note in question
was usurious on its face. 16 There seems to be a fine, if not invisible line,
between the usurious and non-usurious inclusion of acceleration clauses
and savings clauses in contracts and notes that are governed by Texas
law. 17
C. THE REVISION OF UCC ARTICLE 1
The final draft of revised Article 1 of the Code was approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at its an-
nual meeting in August, 2001.18 Revised Article 1 is divided into three
sub-parts: Part 1, General Provisions; Part 2, General Definitions and
Principles of Interpretation; and Part 3, Territorial Applicability and Gen-
eral Rules. Except for the renumbering and relocation of various sec-
tions contained in the present Article 1, several of the provisions remain
unchanged. There are, however, four main areas where significant sub-
stantive changes have taken place.
First, revised section 1-102 explicitly states that the substantive rules of
Article 1 apply only to transactions covered by other Articles of the
Code. Thus, the statute of frauds provision contained in the former sec-
tion 1-20619 applicable to kinds of personal property not otherwise cov-
ered by the Code has been deleted as being inconsistent with the premise
of revised section 1-102. It is reasonable to expect that this change (if
adopted in Texas) will eventually lead to a revisitation of the decision in
Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum.20 In Dresser, the Texas Su-
preme Court made the Code standards of conspicuousness generally ap-
13. Id. at 817. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the rule announced in
Smart v. Tower Land & Inv. Co., 597 S.W.2d 333, 341 (Tex. 1980), where the court stated
that "unless the contract by its express and positive terms evidences an intention which
requires a construction that unearned interest [is] to be collected in all events, the court
will give it the construction that the parties intended that the unearned interest should not
be collected."
14. Armstrong v. Steppes Apartments, Ltd., 57 S.W.3d 37 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2001, pet. denied).
15. Id. at 47. In support of its conclusion, the court cited First State Bank v. Dorst, 843
S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied).
16. See DAN L. NICEWANDER, J. ScoTr SHEEHAN, RICHARD BARR WEST, TEXAS
USUARY LAW HANDBOOK § 20.12 (Supp. 2002).
17. Further discussion on the operation of savings clauses may be found in DAN L.
NICEWANDER, J. SCOTT SHEEHAN, RICHARD BARR WEST, TEXAS USURY LAW HANDBOOK
§§ 4.9 & 20.12 (West 1997 & Supp. 2002).
18. The final text as approved by NCCUSL may be found in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 2002 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS, App. XVII (West 2002).
19. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.206 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2003).
20. Dresser Indus., Inc., 853 S.W.2d at 505.
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plicable to contracts of all types, whether or not otherwise governed by
the Code. Nothing in revised section 1-102, however, prohibits a court
from applying Code rules to non-Code cases, so it is unlikely that this
statutory change would alone reverse Dresser.
Second, revised section 1-103 clarifies the application of supplementary
principles of law and clarifies the circumstances under which the Code is
preemptive. This section also restates the relationship between the pur-
poses and procedures of the Code and other law.
Third, revised section 1-201 defines "good faith" to include observance
of "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing" in addition to "hon-
esty in fact" as it now appears in section 1- 201(19).21 This change con-
forms to the definition of "good faith" in Article 1. The revised definition
of "good faith" appears in all of the other Articles of the Code, with the
exception of Article 5, which continues to define "good faith" as meaning
only "honesty in fact. '22
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, revised section 1-301, derived
from the former section 1-105,23 substantially changes the default choice
of law provisions. Under section 1-301, the parties may choose the law of
any state to govern their transaction, regardless of whether the transac-
tion bears a reasonable relation to that state. In the case of an interna-
tional transaction, a similar rule allows the parties to choose the law of
any country whether or not that country bears a reasonable relation to
the transaction. However, because such an open-ended choice of law rule
has an obvious potential for abuse, other provisions in revised section 1-
301 provide that if one of the parties is a consumer, the choice of law
provision may not deprive the consumer of legal protections afforded by
the law of the state or country in which the consumer resides or of the
state or country where the consumer contracts for and takes delivery of
the goods. Furthermore, the use of the law of a designated state or coun-
try is ineffective to the extent that application of that law violates a fun-
damental public policy of the state or country that has jurisdiction to
adjudicate a dispute arising out of the transaction. If a contract is silent
on a choice of law, the law of the forum state will govern.
Additional reading on the revision of Article 1 may be found in the
sources collected in the accompanying footnote.24
21. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(19) (Vernon 2002).
22. § 5.102(7) (Vernon 2002).
23. § 1.105 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2003).
24. A series of Reporter's Memoranda and Preliminary Drafts on Article 1 may be
found at http://www.nccusl.org (last visited Feb. 19, 2003). An excellent series of articles in
print form appears in the Symposium on Revised Article I and Proposed Revised Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 SMU L. REV. 469-1087 (2001). An article dealing
with the choice of law provisions in revised Article 1 appears in Richard K. Greenstein, Is




II. SALE OF GOODS
A. SCOPE OF CHAPTER 2
Section 2.102 of the Code applies to transactions in goods.25 In Jones v.
CGU Insurance Co.,26 the plaintiff alleged that she became ill after eating
some canned smoked oysters. Acting pro se, she sued both the producer
and its insurance company. The insurance company was dismissed from
the action and the producer settled with the plaintiff. The plaintiff ap-
pealed the dismissal of the insurer. The Austin Court of Appeals held
that the insurer was properly dismissed from the suit because Texas law
does not permit direct actions by third parties against liability insurers.27
The court further held that the plaintiff's claim against the insurer for
breach of express and implied warranties would not lie because the sale
of an insurance policy is not a sale of goods.2 8
B. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The general statute of frauds rule in section 2.201 is that a contract for
the sale of goods at a price of more than five hundred dollars must be in
writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought.29
Even without a writing, however, a contract can satisfy the statute of
frauds requirement if it meets one of three stated statutory exceptions:
(1) if the goods are specially manufactured for the buyer and are not
suitable for resale to others, (2) if the party against whom enforcement is
sought admits in pleadings, testimony, or otherwise in court that a con-
tract was made, or (3) if payment for the goods has been made and ac-
cepted, or if the goods have been received and accepted. 30
In Hugh Symons Group v. Motorola, Inc.,31 the plaintiff buyer at-
tempted to satisfy the statute of frauds by using e-mail correspondence
sent between the parties. 32 The court rejected this contention because
the e-mail did not confirm the existence of a contract but seemed to be
"preliminary information" exchanged between the parties. 33 As an alter-
native, the plaintiff attempted to meet the payment exception by showing
that payment had been made and accepted. To meet this exception, the
plaintiff introduced a "pro forma invoice" showing the shipment of goods
25. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.102 (Vernon 1994).
26. Jones v. CGU Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 626 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).
27. Id. at 629.
28. Id.
29. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE § 2.201(a) (Vernon 1994).
30. § 2.201(c)(1)-(3) (Vernon 1994).
31. Hugh Symons Group v. Motorola, Inc., 292 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 2002).
32. The "flurry of correspondence" noted by the court was apparently introduced to
either satisfy the general statute of frauds requirement or to meet the requirement of TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(b) (Vernon 1994) providing that, as between merchants,
"a writing [sent] in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender" will also
satisfy the statute of frauds requirement against the recipient provided the recipient "has
reason to know [the] contents" of the writing and fails to object to the contents "within ten
days after it is received." Hugh Symons Group, 292 F.3d at 469.
33. Id. at 469-70.
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valued at four-hundred-sixty dollars from the seller to the buyer. 34 The
court rejected the adequacy of this evidence because the "pro forma in-
voice" listed only the value of the goods, not their price, and did not de-
mand payment. 35 The plaintiff introduced no evidence in the form of
checks, receipts, drafts, or other documents indicating that any payment
had been made to the seller. 36 The court ruled that the plaintiff failed to
meet any exception to the statute of frauds.37
Application of the Code standard of good faith has been the subject of
considerable litigation in recent years. 38 In Mathis v. Exxon Corp.,39 the
court, in a carefully reasoned opinion, addressed the scope of the duty of
good faith in the context of open price terms under section 2.305 of the
Code. 40 The court noted that no case in Texas or in the Fifth Circuit had
addressed the question of whether an agreement of the parties that the
seller fix the price "in good faith" requires satisfaction of both the subjec-
tive and the objective elements of good faith. 41
The issue arose because of a dispute between franchisees of retail gas
stations and a major gasoline producer regarding the price fixed by the
producer on a month-to-month basis for the sale of gasoline to the retail
franchisees. The franchisees contended that the price fixed by the pro-
ducer was not fixed in good faith because the price was consistently four
to five cents higher per gallon than was economically justifiable. Accord-
ing to the franchisees, the higher price was intended to drive them out of
business so that the producer could replace their stores with company-
owned stores.42 The producer argued that the price charged to its fran-
chisees was within the range of "dealer tank wagon" prices charged by its
competitors and that this satisfied the good faith requirement because
such a price was commercially reasonable. 43




38. See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Minco Oil & Gas, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 309 (Tex.
1999) (code requirement of good faith not applicable to termination of contract to
purchase natural gas contract) (discussed in John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 53
SMU L. REV. 729, 731 (2000)); Lenape Res. Corp. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 925 S.W.2d
565 (Tex. 1996) (duty of good faith is a background principle of duties under output and
requirements contracts) (discussed in John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 50 SMU L.
REV. 1025, 1030-31 (1997)).
39. Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2002).
40. Id. at 454-57. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.305 (Vernon 1994) permits parties
to conclude a contract for sale even though the price is left open. If the parties have agreed
that the price is to be fixed by the buyer or the seller, the price must be one that is fixed in
good faith.
41. Mathis, 302 F.3d at 455. The definition of good faith applicable to Chapter 2 ap-
pears in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.103(a)(2) (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2003). As
defined in the Code, good faith requires both "honesty in fact" and "observance of reason-
able commercial standards."
42. Mathis, 302 F.3d at 452-53.
43. Id. at 454. A "dealer tank wagon" price is the price charged from time to time for
gasoline delivered by tank truck to a retail gasoline outlet.
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According to the court, the heart of the dispute was whether good faith
required observance of both subjective and objective good faith in light of
the apparent "safe harbor" described in Official Comment 3.44 The pro-
ducer contended that a price that was fixed according to an established
price schedule was within the safe harbor described in Comment 3. The
court reasoned, however, that this safe harbor was not absolute because,
based on the structure of the Code, its legislative history, and case law
from other jurisdictions, the use of a price schedule is commercially rea-
sonable only if the schedule itself is created in subjective good faith.45
The court held that the plaintiff franchisees had produced enough evi-
dence to show that the prices fixed by the seller were determined, not by
economic factors alone, but by a desire to replace franchised outlets with
company owned stores.46 The judgment of the district court, which was
based on a jury finding that the producer had not fixed the price in good
faith, was affirmed. 47
C. WARRANTIES
As usual, several cases involving the Code rules dealing with warran-
ties, disclaimers, and limitation of remedy were reported during the Sur-
vey period. Two of the cases48 involved what appears to be a misreading
of the Texas Supreme Court opinion in Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.
v. FDP Corp.,49 where the court held that a claim for breach of an ex-
press warranty could be asserted in the context of a services contract.
The court noted that, "although the case at bar involves a service transac-
tion, reference to the Code is instructive. ' 50 In its discussion of the Code
rules on express warranty, the court stated, "The UCC recognizes that
breach of contract and breach of warranty are not the same cause of ac-
tion."'51 In Ellis v. Precision Engine Rebuilders, Inc.,52 the Houston Court
of Appeals quoted this sentence in holding that a buyer who sued a seller
for breach of contract for the delivery of defective goods failed to plead
44. Id. at 454-55. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.305 cmt. 3 (Vernon 1994)
provides:
Subsection (2), dealing with the situation where the price is to be fixed by
one party rejects the uncommercial idea that an agreement that the seller
may fix the price means that he may fix any price he may wish by the express
qualification that the price so fixed must be fixed in good faith. Good faith
includes observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the trade if the party is a merchant. (Section 2-103). But in the normal case a
"posted price" or a future seller's or buyer's "given price," "price in effect,"
"market price," or the like satisfies the good faith requirement.
45. Mathis, 302 F.3d at 457.
46. Id. at 458-59.
47. Id. at 462.
48. JHC Ventures, L.P. v. Fast Trucking, Inc., No. 04-01-00251-CV, 2002 WL 31662057
(Tex. App.-San Antonio, November 27, 2002, no pet. h.); Ellis v. Precision Engine Re-
builders, Inc., 68 S.W.3d 894 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
49. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1991).
50. Id. at 575.
51. Id. at 576.
52. Ellis, 68 S.W.3d at 894.
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his claim as a breach of warranty action. A strong dissenting opinion
argued that the majority (1) misapplied Southwestern Bell, (2) failed to
recognize that breach of warranty claims are merely a subset of breach of
contract claims, and (3) created a pleading requirement akin to the com-
mon law forms of action.53
In JHC Ventures, L.P. v. Fast Trucking, Inc.,54 the plaintiff sued for
breach of an express warranty made in connection with the sale of trucks.
The plaintiff also sought recovery of attorney's fees under the Civil Prac-
tices and Remedies Code provisions allowing such recovery in contract
actions.55 Although the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the
buyer could recover for breach of warranty, it also quoted the statement
from Southwestern Bell that the "UCC recognizes that breach of contract
and breach of warranty are not the same cause of action," and denied the
recovery of attorney's fees because the plaintiff had sued for breach of
warranty and not for breach of contract. 56 Although this holding seems
erroneous, the issue was mooted because the plaintiff also asserted that
the breach of warranty was a violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act (DTPA).5 7 Because the DTPA itself allows the recovery of attor-
ney's fees, the fees could be awarded on that basis even if they were not
recoverable for a breach of warranty claim under the Code. 58
This use of a single sentence from Southwestern Bell to support a ques-
tionable, if not indefensible, bright line distinction between breach of
contract claims and breach of warranty claims is reminiscent of how the
phrase "inextricably intertwined" was first used in Knight v. International
Harvestor Credit Corp.59 In Knight, the phrase "inextricably intertwined"
took on a new dimension as an additional theory of vicarious liability
until the Texas Supreme Court clarified its use of the phrase in Qantel
Business Systems, Inc. v. Custom Controls Co.60 It is likely that the same
kind of clarification will be needed in regard to the statement in South-
western Bell that the "UCC recognizes that breach of contract and breach
of warranty are not the same cause of action. 61
In a case addressing a somewhat less philosophical issue than the rela-
tionship between breaches of contract and breaches of warranty, Womco,
53. Id. at 899-900.
54. JHC Ventures, L.P., 2002 WL 31662057.
55. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001(8) (Vernon 1997) allows recovery of
reasonable attorney's fees if the claim is based on an "oral or written contract."
56. JHC Ventures, 2002 WL 31662057, at *4. It is worth noting that the court cited
Ellis, 68 S.W.3d at 894, discussed supra note 52 in reaching this conclusion.
57. JHC Ventures, 2002 WL 31662057, at *8. The Deceptive Trade Practices Act ap-
pears as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.43-.63 (Vernon 2002). Actions under the Act
for breach of warranty are permitted by § 17.50(a)(2).
58. JHC Ventures, 2002 WL 31662057, at *8. The recovery of attorney's fees under the
DTPA is permitted by TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon 2002).
59. Knight v. Int'l Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 389 (Tex. 1982).
60. Qantel Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Custom Controls Co., 761 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1988). In
Qantel, the court explained that the "inextricably intertwined" phrase had been taken out
of the context in which it had been used.
61. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 811 S.W.2d at 576.
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Inc. v. Navistar International Corp.,62 the Tyler Court of Appeals held
that a disclaimer of warranty must not only meet the requirements of
section 2.316 regarding terminology and conspicuousness, but that the
seller must also show that the buyer had an opportunity to examine the
disclaimer prior to consummation of the contract of sale.63 Because the
seller failed to show that the disclaimer was communicated to the buyer
prior to the sale, summary judgment was inappropriate on the issue of
whether the disclaimer was effective. 64
In Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Cabler,65 the seller of a mobile
home argued that a disclaimer of oral statements contained in the deliv-
ery instructions and in the Homeowners Information form amounted to
an "as is" disclaimer of liability for defects in the home. The El Paso
Court of Appeals held that the unequal bargaining position of the parties
and the reliance of the buyers on the representations of the seller ren-
dered the written disclaimers in a "huge stack" of documents ineffec-
tive.66 Furthermore, the evidence indicated that the seller "did not
intend to perform the repairs it promised. '67 This evidence, coupled with
the ineffectiveness of the disclaimers, resulted in the affirmance of the
judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff buyers for $121,450,
except for $2,500 in expert witness fees that the plaintiffs agreed to omit
from the final judgment.68
There is a story in the legal literature, perhaps only apocryphal, about a
lawyer who once argued a case before the House of Lords in London.
Part of his argument concerned the question of whether the owner of
land also owned the rights above and below his land. In response to the
question, "Mr. Sullivan, have your clients not heard of the maxim, 'cujus
est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos ?' (the owner of land
owns to the sky and to the depths)," the lawyer answered, "My lords, the
peasants of Northern Ireland speak of little else."'69 Perhaps the same
could be said about FIFRA which, as we all know, is the acronym for the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.70
For matters within its scope, FIFRA preempts state law claims that rely
on advertising, labeling, and marketing materials as the basis for breach
of warranty, DTPA, and fraud claims. In Dow Agrosciences, LLC v.
Bates,71 a herbicide manufacturer sought a declaratory judgment against
62. Womco, Inc. v. Navistar Int'l Corp., 84 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. App.-Tyler, 2002, no
pet.).
63. Id. at 280.
64. Id.
65. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Cabler, 73 S.W.3d 363 (Tex. App.-E Paso 2002,
pet. denied).
66. Id. at 371-72.
67. Id. at 372.
68. Id. at 376.
69. Although this is not the only reference to this story, this particular version may be
found in Steel Creek Dev. Corp. v. James, 294 S.E.2d 23, 27 n.2 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
70. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a-136y (2000).
71. Dow Agrosciences, LLC v. Bates, 205 F. Supp. 2d 623 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
20031 1263
SMU LAW REVIEW
a group of peanut farmers to determine the parties' rights and liabilities
under FIFRA regarding warranty, DTPA, and fraud allegations made by
the farmers. As to the warranty claims, the court held that FIFRA pre-
empted the claims because they were based on allegedly inaccurate state-
ments on the product label. 72 Alternatively, the court also ruled that,
even if the claims were not preempted, a conspicuous disclaimer on the
label would effectively foreclose the claims under state law.73 As to the
fraud claims, the court ruled that, to the extent that the claims were based
on remarks that reflected the statements made on the product label, the
claims were preempted. 74 The court further held, however, that claims
based on statements that went beyond those on the product label were
not preempted, but that such claims were subject to the limitation of lia-
bility stated on the label. 75 Under section 2.719 of the Code, the liability
of a seller can be limited to remedies stated in the contract, such as re-
pair, replacement, or refund. 76 The court held that the farmers' remedies
were limited to refund or replacement as provided in the limitation of
remedy provision stated on the product label.77
In American Cyanamid Co. v. Geye,78 another group of peanut farmers
successfully avoided FIFRA preemption of their claims for crop damage
based on breach of warranty, strict liability and DTPA violations. The
critical difference in this case was the reasoning by the court that FIFRA
only preempts state law claims when the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has exercised its authority to regulate the labeling of a
product. 79 Because the EPA had chosen not to regulate the effectiveness
of the herbicides in question, there were no labeling or packaging re-
quirements imposed by FIFRA that would preempt the state law
claims.80
In the significant decision of Centex Homes v. Buecher,81 the Texas Su-
preme Court clarified the extent to which the warranties implied in the
construction and sale of a new home can be disclaimed. A brief review of
the Texas law on this subject will make the importance of Centex more
evident.
In Humber v. Morton,82 the Texas Supreme Court held that the con-
struction and sale of a new home carried with it a warranty of habitability
72. Id. at 626.
73. Id. at 627. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(b) (Vernon 1994) permits the
disclaimer of warranties.
74. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 627. On this point the court relied on
the earlier Fifth Circuit decision in Andrus v. AgrEvo USA Co., 178 F.3d 395 (5th Cir.
1999), holding that claims linked to statements on a product label are preempted by
FIFRA.
75. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 628.
76. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.719 (Vernon 1994).
77. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 628.
78. Am. Cyanide Co. v. Geye, 79 S.W.3d 21 (Tex. 2002).
79. Id. at 23.
80. Id.
81. Centex Homes v. Buecher, 95 S.W.3d 266 (Tex. 2002).
82. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
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and good workmanship. In G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux,83 the court held
that this warranty could be disclaimed. However, in Evans v. J. Stiles,
Inc. ,84 the court revisited Humber and held that the intent of Humber was
to create not one, but two warranties-a warranty of habitability and a
warranty of good workmanship. In Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v.
Barnes,85 the court created an implied warranty of good workmanship in
the repair or modification of tangible goods or property and further ruled
that this warranty could not be disclaimed. In the same opinion, the court
stated, "To the extent that it conflicts with this opinion, we overrule G-W-
L, Inc. v. Robichaux. '86
The difficulty with the partial overruling of Robichaux was determining
the "extent" of the overruling, a difficulty predicted by this author soon
after the opinion in Melody was handed down. 87 That issue has now been
addressed in Centex.88 Under that decision, the parties to an agreement
for the sale of a new home "may supersede the implied standard for
workmanship, but the agreement cannot simply disclaim it." 89 An at-
tempted disclaimer is effective only when the agreement "provides for
the manner, performance or quality of the desired construction." 90 As to
the separate warranty of habitability, the court stated that this warranty
"may not be disclaimed generally," but added that the warranty only ex-
tends to latent defects and "does not include defects, even substantial
ones, that are known by or expressly disclosed to the buyer." 91
It is important to note that Centex only addressed the warranty of good
workmanship in connection with the sale of new homes. It does not ad-
dress the question of whether the warranty of good workmanship in the
repair or modification of tangible goods or property may be disclaimed. 92
III. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A. FORM OF INSTRUMENTS
Under section 3.104 of the Code, an instrument can include not only a
requirement that the obligor pay a "fixed amount of money," but also a
requirement that the payment include the payment of interest.93 Section
83. G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982).
84. Evans v. J. Stiles, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. 1985).
85. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
86. Id. at 355.
87. See John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 42 Sw. L.J. 217, 224 (1988).
88. Centex Homes, 95 S.W.3d at 266.
89. Id. at 274.
90. Id. at 275.
91. Id.
92. As Peter Lawrence Berra, the noted neurolinguist, once observed, "Prediction is
difficult, particularly about the future." The author will, nonetheless, hazard a prediction
that the "anti-disclaimer rule" of Melody Home Mfg. Co. will eventually parallel the treat-
ment accorded in Centex to the implied warranty of good workmanship in the sale of a new
home.
93. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104(a) (Vernon 2002) provides, inter alia, that a
"'negotiable instrument' means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount
of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order ......
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3.112 expands on this rule by providing that interest can be stated as ei-
ther a fixed or variable amount of money or expressed as a fixed or varia-
ble rate or rates. 94 In Montgomery First Corp. v. Caprock Investment
Corp. ,5 the holder of a note moved for summary judgment to recover the
balance due on the note, including interest that was tied to the base rate
of a failed bank. The Eastland Court of Appeals held that, in the case of
a variable interest rate tied to the base rate of a failed bank, the holder
was required to establish a "reasonable rate" as a substitute for the rate
stated in the note.96 Because of a failure to establish this rate, the holder
did not meet its summary judgment burden and the case was remanded
for further proceedings.97
One of the features of a negotiable instrument is the ability to transfer
the instrument from one person to another by indorsement or assign-
ment. In Vernor v. Southwest Federal Land Bank Ass'n,98 the defendant
makers of a promissory note argued that the note was non-assignable.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that, as a matter of law, a provi-
sion in the note referring to the "Bank or the owner or holder of the
note" indicated that the parties contemplated that the note might be
transferred. 99 The court further noted that there was nothing in the note
prohibiting assignment. 100 The assignment of the note was, therefore,
proper and the plaintiff holder was entitled to recover on it. 10
94. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.112(b) (Vernon 2002) provides:
Interest may be stated in an instrument as a fixed or variable amount of
money or it may be expressed as a fixed or variable rate or rates. The amount
or rate of interest may be stated or described in the instrument in any man-
ner and may require reference to information not contained in the instru-
ment. If an instrument provides for interest, but the amount of interest
payable cannot be ascertained from the description, interest is payable at the
judgment rate in effect at the place of payment of the instrument and at the
time interest first accrues, and the instrument shall not by virtue of this sen-
tence be considered to violate the provisions of Title 4, Finance Code.
95. Montgomery First Corp. v. Caprock Inv. Corp., 89 S.W.3d 179 (Tex. App.-East-
land 2002, no pet.).
96. Id. at 186. The court based its ruling on the prior cases of Bailey, Vaught, Robert-
son & Co. v. Remington Investments, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 860, 866 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no
writ) (finding that a reasonable rate of interest should be used if a note is tied to the prime
rate or base rate of a failed bank), and Commercial Services of Perry, Inc. v. Wooldridge,
968 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (same). Because of the large
number of bank failures during the 1980s, the Bailey case, in particular, resolved an impor-
tant issue about the proper rate to be applied when an interest rate was tied to the rate of a
failed bank.
97. Montgomery First Corp., 89 S.W.3d at 187.
98. Vernor v. Southwest Fed. Land Bank Ass'n, 77 S.W.3d 364 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2002, pet. denied).
99. Id. at 366.
100. Id. On the issue of clauses prohibiting assignment, it is important to note that TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.406 & 9.408 (Vernon 2002), effective on July 1, 2001, now
contain a number of provisions that invalidate anti-assignment clauses. A discussion and
analysis of these sections appears in John Krahmer, Anti-Assignment Clauses and Struc-
tured Settlements Under Revised Article 9, 56 CON. FIN. L.Q. REP. 25 (2002).
101. Vernor, 77 S.W.3d at 367.
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B. LIABILITY OF PARTIES
Chapter 3 of the Code divides instruments into two broad categories.
Those that meet the formal requirements of section 3.104 are "negotiable
instruments." Those that do not meet the requirements are non-negotia-
ble. While Chapter 3 by its own terms applies only to negotiable instru-
ments, a court may choose to apply the rules of Chapter 3 by analogy in
appropriate cases.' 0 2 Whether negotiable or non-negotiable, a promis-
sory note is merely a specialized form of contract and is subject to the
usual rules of contract interpretation. This principle was recognized in
Fein v. R.P.H., Inc.,10 3 where the Houston Court of Appeals held that a
note signed by a maker "without recourse" limited the holder's remedy to
the foreclosure of collateral securing the note.10 4 The court based this
conclusion on language in the note stating that the maker was "without
liability, warranty or obligation" and that there was "no personal guar-
anty" of the maker to pay the note. 105
One of the baseline rules of Chapter 3 is that a party is not liable on an
instrument unless the party signed the instrument or it was signed by an
agent or representative of the party.10 6 In the ordinary course of events,
this rule also means that, absent negligence, a party is not liable on an
instrument if the party's signature is forged. 10 7 However, determining
whether a party was or was not negligent can be a difficult and uncertain
inquiry. Due to this uncertainty, a party may want to obtain forgery in-
surance to guard against the risk of an adverse ruling on this issue. In
Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Baptist Health System,'08
the plaintiff purchased such insurance to protect itself against losses
caused by forgery. As matters developed, a vendor with whom the plain-
tiff dealt submitted a series of invoices for work that was never per-
formed, and the invoices bore the forged signatures of various managers
employed by the plaintiff. Over a period of time, the plaintiff's accounts
payable department issued almost nine-hundred-thousand dollars worth
of checks to the dishonest vendor. When the scheme was discovered, the
102. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 3.102(a) (Vernon 2002) ("This chapter ap-
plies to negotiable instruments."). However, section 3.104, comment 2 (Vernon 2002)
notes that "nothing in Section 3-104 or in Section 3-102 is intended to mean that in a
particular case involving [a non-negotiable instrument] a court could not arrive a result
similar to the result that would follow if the writing were a negotiable instrument." TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104 cmt. 2 (Vernon 2002).
103. Fein v. R.P.H., Inc., 68 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet.
denied).
104. Id. at 266-67.
105. Id. at 263. The court did not mention that the note in question provided that the
maker promised to "Pay to" the payee instead of stating that the maker promised to "Pay
to the order of" the payee. Except in the case of checks, the failure to make an instrument
payable to order or bearer renders the instrument non-negotiable. TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 3.104(a), (c) (Vernon 2002).
106. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.401(a) (Vernon 2002).
107. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.406(a) (Vernon 2002).




plaintiff filed a proof of loss under its forgery policy. The insurer denied
the claim and the plaintiff sued. On cross-motions for summary judgment
based on undisputed facts, the plaintiff prevailed in the trial court. 10 9 On
appeal, however, the decision of the trial court was reversed and judg-
ment was entered for the insurer.
The critical language in the policy dealing with forgery coverage pro-
vided that the insurer would pay for losses resulting from forgeries on
"Covered Instruments" that were "made or drawn by or drawn upon [the
insured]" or "made or drawn by one acting as [the insured's] agent." 110
"Covered Instruments" were defined to include "checks, drafts, promis-
sory notes or similar written promises, orders or directions to pay a sum
certain in 'Money.""' I I Based on this language, the court found that the
forged invoices were not "Covered Instruments."'" 2 As written, the pol-
icy protected against losses caused by the forgery of a drawer's or maker's
name as those terms are defined in section 3.103 of the Code." 3 Because
the invoices were neither drafts nor notes that ordered or promised the
payment of money, there was no coverage under the policy. 114
In addition to drawers and makers, another group of persons who may
be liable for the payment of instruments are those who sign as guarantors.
A guaranty may be part of the instrument itself and, in this case, the
guarantors are termed "accommodation part[ies]" by section 3.419 of the
Code. 1 5 The guaranty may also take the form of a separate agreement
under which the guarantor agrees to pay the instrument when it comes
due if it is not paid by the principal obligor. If a guaranty takes the form
of a separate agreement, a question may arise as to whether the transfer
of an instrument is also effective to transfer the obligation of the guaran-
tor. This situation arose in Escalante v. Luckie,116 where four guarantors
signed guaranty agreements to secure loans evidenced by three separate
promissory notes. All three notes were assigned by the original payees to
the same assignee. When the makers failed to pay the notes, the assignee
sued both the makers and the guarantors. The assignee proved that he
had possession of the guaranty agreements and introduced them into evi-
dence, even though the assignment of a note does not automatically as-
sign an underlying agreement. 117 The Eastland Court of Appeals held
that possession of the agreements was sufficient to show that the guaran-
ties had been assigned to the assignee." 8 Although the assignee was able
109. Id. at 297.
110. Id. at 298.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 299.
113. Under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.103(a)(3), (5) (Vernon 2002), the drawer
of a draft (which includes checks) is defined as the person ordering payment; the maker of
a note is defined as the person who agrees to pay.
114. Id.
115. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.419(a) (Vernon 2002).
116. Escalante v. Luckie, 77 S.W.3d 410 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, pet. denied).




to show that all three notes and guaranties had been assigned, he was
able to recover on only two of them because one of the three guaranties
was a limited guaranty that did not show it was related to the particular
note in question. 1" 9 As to one of the notes, judgment was rendered in
favor of the guarantors; as to the other two notes, judgment was rendered
in favor of the assignee.' 20
In El Paso Refining, Inc. v. Scurlock Permian Corp.,121 a guarantor at-
tempted to avoid liability under a continuing guaranty by asserting the
defense of usury. The El Paso Court of Appeals first considered whether
a claim that a transaction was usurious had to be proven by clear and
convincing evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence.' 22 After re-
viewing conflicting lines of authority on this issue, the court held that the
better view was to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard as
being consistent with the general burden of proof standard in civil
cases. 123 Having settled the burden of proof issue, the court turned to the
question of whether the guarantor had standing to assert usury as a de-
fense to its guaranty. 124 Based on the language of the guaranty agree-
ment and on prior Texas case law, the court held that the guarantor
lacked standing to raise the defense of usury.' 25
In La Salle Bank, N.A. v. Sleutal,126 the guarantor asserted a right of
offset as a defense in a deficiency action following the foreclosure sale of
real estate securing a promissory note. The guarantor argued that he was
permitted an offset under section 51.003 of the Texas Property Code be-
cause the foreclosure price was below the fair market value of the prop-
erty. 127 Although the court agreed that the statute permits a right of
offset when a foreclosure price is below fair market value, the critical
issue before the court was whether the guarantor had waived the right of
offset by the terms of the guaranty agreement. The court found that no
Texas cases had addressed the issue of waiver of the right of offset; there-
fore, it had to rely on statutory interpretation to determine if this right
119. Id. at 417.
120. Id. at 423.
121. El Paso Ref., Inc. v. Scurlock Permian Corp., 77 S.W.3d 374 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2002, pet. denied).
122. Id. at 380-81.
123. Id. at 382. In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the contrary line of case
that began with Great Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Williams, 105 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1937, no writ), characterizing the case as "nothing more than an anom-
aly." Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 386. The cases relied on by the court included Ginsberg 1985 Real Estate
Partnership v. Cadle Co., 39 F.3d 528, 534 (5th Cir. 1994) (under Texas law a guarantor
does not escape obligation by asserting usury); Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577
S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. 1979) (same); and Universal Metals & Machinery v. Bohart, 539
S.W.2d 874, 878 (Tex. 1976) (use of the term "primary obligor" does not make a guarantor
a co-maker or co-obligor jointly liable for repayment).
126. LaSalle Bank v. Sleutal, 289 F.3d 837 (5th Cir. 2002).
127. Id. at 839; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003(c) (Vernon 1995) provides, in part, that
"[i]f the court determines that the fair market value [of the real property] is greater than
the sale price of the real property at the foreclosure sale, the persons against whom recov-
ery of the deficiency is sought are entitled to an offset against the deficiency . ... "
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could be waived. Applying the principle of inclusio unius est exclusio al-
terius, the court found that numerous other provisions in the Property
Code specifically prohibited waivers. 128 Because it was evident that the
"Texas Legislature knows how to preclude waiver of statutory provisions
when it so desires," the court held that the Legislature's failure to pre-
clude waiver of the right of offset indicated that waivers were allowed
and that the guaranty agreement had effectively waived that right.1 29
C. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Section 3.118 of the Code provides a variety of limitation periods appli-
cable to different kinds of instruments. 130 While most of the provisions in
section 3.118 do not require examination of other law, section 3.118(h) is
an exception because of its reference to the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. 131 In Aguero v. Ramirez,132 the plaintiff filed suit on a
promissory note some five years after its due date. The defendant con-
tended that because the note was secured by real property, the applicable
statute of limitations was the four-year period specified in the Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code. 133 The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals dis-
agreed, pointing out that the plaintiff was not seeking to foreclose a real
property lien, but was seeking to enforce a right to payment. Because the
plaintiff was only seeking to enforce a note, the six-year limitation period
applicable to notes payable at a definite time was the appropriate limita-
tion period to apply. 134
IV. BANK TRANSACTIONS
In Southwest Bank v. Information Support Concepts, Inc., 35 an em-
ployee stole checks payable to her employer and deposited them in her
128. La Salle Bank, 289 F.3d at 841. The court noted that waivers were prohibited in,
e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 28.006(a) (Vernon 2000) (waiver of prompt payment to
contractors and subcontractors); § 54.043(b) (waiver of rights concerning landlord's liens);
§ 59.004 (waiver of rights in self-service facility contracts); and § 62.022 (waiver of real
estate broker's right to lien).
129. La Salle Bank, 289 F.3d at 841.
130. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.118(a) (Vernon 2002) (limitation pe-
riod for notes payable at a definite time is six years from the due date); § 3.118(c) (action
on unaccepted draft must be brought within three years after dishonor or within ten years
after issue if no dishonor occurs); § 3.118(d) (action on certified check, teller's check, cash-
ier's check, or traveler's check must be brought within three years after demand for
payment).
131. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.118(h) (Vernon 2002) provides, "This section
does not apply to an action involving a real property lien covered by Section 16.035 or
16.036, Civil Practice and Remedies Code."
132. Aguero v. Ramirez, 70 S.W.3d 372 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied).
133. Id. at 374. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.035(a) (Vernon 2002) provides that
"[a] person must bring suit for the recovery of real property under a real property lien or
the foreclosure of a real property lien not later than four years after the day the cause of
action accrues."
134. Aguero, 70 S.W.3d at 375. The six year limitation period for notes payable at a
definite time appears in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.118(a) (Vernon 2002).
135. Southwest Bank v. Info. Support Concepts, Inc., 85 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2002, pet. filed).
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personal account. The checks were not indorsed by the employer, and
the employer did not have an account with the bank; however, the bank
still accepted the deposits. The employer sued the employee's bank for
conversion under section 3.420.136 The bank argued the employer was
contributorily negligent, had assumed the risk of its employee's dishon-
esty, and had failed to mitigate its damages. The bank also sought to add
the employee to the suit through the proportionate responsibility statute.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly
denied the bank's motion to join the employee as a responsible third
party because the UCC provides the rules for loss allocation in a negotia-
ble instruments setting, and the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
conflicts with the Code on this subject.' 37 The court noted that the Code
provides banks with proportionate responsibility defenses when an em-
ployer's negligence contributes to forgeries and alterations of an instru-
ment, but it does not apply the idea of proportionate responsibility to
conversion cases arising under section 3.420, which utilizes an absolute
liability standard. 138 While the court agreed that the Code provided the
employee's bank with a claim against the employee for breach of transfer
warranties, the employee's bank had no claim against the employer be-
cause the bank was in the best position to discover the missing
indorsements.139
In Moorehouse v. Chase Manhattan Bank,140 a non-customer payee
cashed a check drawn on a bank customer's business account and the
bank charged a fee for cashing the check. The payee sued the bank alleg-
ing that such a fee (1) was a conversion under the Code, (2) violated the
Texas Theft and Liability Act, 141 (3) resulted in unjust enrichment of the
bank, and (4) constituted fraud. The bank's motion for summary judg-
ment was granted on all causes of action. The payee appealed. 142
The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the motion for summary
judgment was properly granted. As to the conversion claim, the court
found that the holder failed to show that she had demanded return of the
check and that the bank failed to return it on demand. 143 The court also
held there was no violation of the Texas Theft and Liability Act because
the payee consented to the bank's possession of the check. 144 Further-
136. Id. at 463. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.420 (Vernon 2002) permits actions
for conversion if an instrument is taken by improper transfer or if payment is made to a
person who is not entitled to enforce the instrument.
137. Southwest Bank, 85 S.W.3d at 467. The conflict noted by the court concerned the
loss allocation rules in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.405-.406 (Vernon 2002) and the
proportionate responsibility rules in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.002(a) (Vernon
1997).
138. Southwest Bank, 85 S.W.3d at 467.
139. Id. at 467-68.
140. Moorehouse v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 76 S.W.3d 608 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2002, no pet.).
141. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 31.03, 31.06 & 31.08 (Vernon 2003).
142. Moorehouse, 76 S.W.3d at 611.
143. Id. at 613.
144. Id. at 614.
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more, no fraud existed because there was no fiduciary relationship be-
tween the payee and the bank requiring disclosure of the fee until the
holder sought to cash the check. Because the bank did disclose the fee at
that time, the fraud claim would not lie. 145 Judgment in favor of the bank
was affirmed.146
In FNFS, Ltd. v. Security State Bank & Trust,147 an embezzler who had
authority to sign checks for his employer cashed more than one hundred
thousand dollars worth of checks at the payor bank. Most of the checks
named the payor bank as the payee, but a few checks named third parties
as the payee. The Austin Court of Appeals correctly held that no in-
dorsement was required for the checks made payable to the payor bank
because the act of payment was not a "negotiation" of the checks but was
instead a final settlement of those checks. 148 As to the checks made pay-
able to third parties, the court held that, while an indorsement was re-
quired for those checks, the employer was required to offer some
evidence that the intended payees did not receive the funds. No such
evidence was produced. Summary judgment was affirmed in favor of the
bank.
In Community Bank & Trust, S.S.B. v. Fleck,149 the personal represen-
tative of a deceased bank customer sued the bank to recover the amount
of five checks that had been forged on the customer's account prior to the
customer's death. Although the deposit agreement provided that claims
based on unauthorized signatures or alterations had to be made within
fourteen days after the bank sent a statement of account to the customer,
some eleven months passed before the representative asserted a claim
against the bank. Based on the deposit agreement, the bank refused to
pay. In an action against the bank, the representative alleged that all
conditions precedent to the representative's right to maintain the suit had
been performed. The bank answered with a pleading that asserted the
limitations rules in section 4.406 of the Code, including a requirement
that notice of a claim be given with "reasonable" promptness. 150 Inexpli-
cably, however, the bank did not assert the fourteen day limitation con-
tained in the deposit agreement in its pleading (a point that initially
seemed to be of no consequence, but took on great significance when the
case reached the Texas Supreme Court).
145. Id. at 614-15.
146. Id. at 615.
147. FNFS, Ltd. v. Sec. State Bank & Trust, 63 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001,
pet. denied).
148. The purpose of a negotiation is to give the transferee the status of a holder under
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.201 (Vernon 2002). Because the function of a payor
bank is to pay an instrument, a signature made by the person presenting an instrument at
the time of presentment is not an indorsement, but rather a signed receipt for payment. See
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.501(b)(2)(C) (Vernon 2002).
149. Cmty. Bank & Trust, S.S.B. v. Fleck, No. 00-1122, 2002 WL 31719856 (Tex. Dec. 5,
2002) (per curiam) (opinion not yet released for publication).
150. Id. at *1; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406(c) (Vernon 2002).
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At trial, the representative moved for summary judgment and the bank
responded by arguing that it did not receive notice within the fourteen
days required by the deposit agreement. The representative objected that
the bank did not plead the terms of the deposit agreement in its answer
and had not specifically denied the allegations of the complaint. Because
of this failure on the part of the bank, the representative was not required
to prove that the conditions precedent had been met and judgment was
entered in favor of the representative. Even after this issue was raised,
the bank did not amend its pleadings.
On appeal to the Beaumont Court of Appeals, the bank again raised
the fourteen day limitation period contained in the deposit agreement. 151
Addressing this contention, the court affirmed the trial court on the the-
ory that section 16.071(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
invalidates contract provisions requiring a claimant to give notice of a
claim for damages within ninety days as a condition of bringing suit.152
On further appeal, the Texas Supreme Court held that the court of ap-
peals erred because the supreme court had previously ruled that section
16.071(a) did not apply to deposit agreements because the notice re-
quired by such agreements is not notice of a claim for damages, but no-
tice that an account transaction was unauthorized.1 53 The supreme court
specifically disapproved this portion of the court of appeals' decision.
Notwithstanding this error, the judgment of the trial court and the court
of appeals was upheld because the bank had never raised the deposit
agreement in its pleadings as a defense to the eleven-month delay by the
representative. 154 The supreme court pointed out, however, that it inti-
mated no view on whether the fourteen day notice requirement in the
deposit agreement was reasonable. 155
V. LETTERS OF CREDIT
Letters of credit are a curious creation of the law. On the one hand,
they resemble guaranties; on the other hand, they resemble independent
contracts. On top of this, they are governed, sometimes, by Chapter 5 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. 156 The parties are free, however, to
choose other applicable law if they so desire, most commonly the Uni-
form Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP), a document
copyrighted by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The
151. The opinion of the court of appeals is reported in Community Bank & Trust, S.S.B.
v. Fleck, 21 S.W.3d 923 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, pet denied).
152. Cmty. Bank & Trust, S.S.B., 21 S.W.3d at 924-25. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 16.071(a) (Vernon 1997) provides, in part, that "[a] contract stipulation that re-
quires a claimant to give notice of a claim for damages as a condition precedent to the right
to sue on the contract is not valid unless the stipulation is reasonable. A stipulation that
requires notification within less that 90 days is void."
153. On this point, the court cited its prior decision in American Airlines Employees
Federal Credit Union v. Martin, 29 S.W.3d 86, 97 (Tex. 2000).
154. Cmty. Bank & Trust, S.S.B., 2002 WL 31719856, at *2.
155. Id.
156. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.101 -.118 (Vernon 2002).
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UCP has not been enacted as law in any jurisdiction and the contents are
often unknown to the parties who adopt it (and they may adopt any one
of the five different iterations that have been published by the ICC, the
most recent being UCP 500). 157
In Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China,t 58 to facilitate a
purchase, a buyer of plastics obtained a letter of credit from the Bank of
China providing for payment to the seller of 1.2 million dollars upon the
seller's presentation of specified documents to the issuer. The letter of
credit incorporated UCP 500. The seller presented the documents to the
issuer on August 9, 1995. Under UCP 500, the issuer had until August 18,
1995 to refuse to honor the letter of credit. 159 The issue before the court
was whether a telex from the issuer sent on August 11th constituted an
effective notice of refusal to honor, particularly since it contained a clause
stating, "We [the issuer] are contacting the applicant for acceptance of the
relative documents of the relative discrepancy. Holding documents at
your risk and disposal."' 160
Under both Chapter 5 of the Code and under the UCP, whether an
issuer has acted properly in honoring or dishonoring a presentation under
a letter of credit is measured by the "standard practice" of issuers.161 The
court held that the language of the telex failed to use the standard lan-
guage for refusal of a presentation and created an ambiguity as to
whether the documents might be accepted at a later date if waiver by the
applicant was obtained. Judgment in favor of the beneficiary was
affirmed.
In Synergy Center, Ltd. v. Lone Star Franchising, Inc.,162 a restaurant
lessee entered into a commercial lease agreement. A condition of the
lease required the lessee to establish a "credit line of $100,000 for the sole
purpose of acting in lieu of a monetary guarantee in the event of [the
lessee's] default."' 63 Prior to the end of the lease term, the lessee ceased
operating the restaurant. The lessor immediately notified the lessee that
it was in default under the lease and demanded accelerated payments of
all the rent remaining under the lease. If the lessee did not pay the accel-
erated rent within seven days of the notice, the lessor threatened to draw
under the letter of credit. The lessee sought a temporary injunction to
enjoin the lessor from making a presentation.
157. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE PuB. No. 500, ICC UNIFORM CUSTOMS & PRAC-
TICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1993) [hereinafter UCP]. Prior versions were num-
bered as 100, 200, etc.
158. Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 288 F.3d 262 (5th Cir. 2002).
159. Under UCP 500, Art. 14(d), the issuer must give notice of dishonor within seven
banking days following the date of presentation. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.108(b)
(Vernon 2002) requires that notice be given in the same length of time.
160. Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp., 288 F.3d at 266.
161. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.108(c) (Vernon 2002) and the description of
"standard practice" under UCP 500 outlined by the court. Voest-Alpine Trading USA
Corp., 288 F.3d at 266-67.
162. Synergy Ctr., Ltd. v. Lone Star Franchising, Inc., 63 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. App.-Aus-
tin 2001, no pet.).
163. Id. at 563.
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The Austin Court of Appeals held that a party cannot enjoin a presen-
tation under a letter of credit unless there is evidence of fraud and, in this
case, there was no such evidence. 164 According to the court, a mere con-
tractual dispute between the parties would not bar the lessor from exer-
cising its rights under the lease.165 Moreover, the lessor had not acted
unscrupulously so as to deny it the right to make a presentation under the
letter of credit. 166
In Parkans International LLC v. Zurich Insurance Co.,167 a buyer pur-
chased scrap metal from an exporter under a letter of credit. The ex-
porter failed to ship the scrap metal, but obtained payment by using
fraudulent documents. The buyer suffered a heavy loss and sought com-
pensation from its insurer under the forgery coverage clause in its insur-
ance policy. The insurer contended that the claim was not covered by the
buyer's policy. The critical language in the policy provided that the in-
surer would pay for the loss of "Covered Instruments such as checks,
drafts, promissory notes, or similar written promises, orders or directions
to pay a sum certain in 'money' that are made or drawn by or drawn upon
[the insured.]"' 168 The insurer denied the claim on the ground that, be-
cause the insured did not "draw" the documents, the loss was not
covered. 69
The court agreed with the insurer and held that the forgeries were not
"covered instruments" because the forged documents had not been
"drawn by or upon" the insured.' 70 The documents, instead, had been
forged by the beneficiary and the draw was made on the issuer of the
letter of credit, not on the beneficiary.' 7'
VI. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. SCOPE OF CHAPTER 9
In addition to covering true security interests, revised Chapter 9 now
covers agricultural liens; sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment in-
tangibles, and promissory notes; consignments; and security interests aris-
164. An injunction against honor may be obtained under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 5.109(b) (Vernon 2002) if "honor of the presentation would facilitate a material
fraud by the beneficiary." On this point, the court noted that Chapter 5 of the Code had
been substantially amended in 1999. Synergy Ctr., Ltd., 63 S.W.3d 565, 566 n.3. In the
view of the court, however, the amendments did not change the circumstances when fraud
might form the basis for injunctive relief under the interpretation of the prior version of
Chapter 5 by the Texas Supreme Court in Phillip Bros. v. Oil Country Specialists, Ltd., 787
S.W.2d 38, 40-41 (Tex. 1990).
165. Synergy Center, Ltd., 63 S.W.3d at 566.
166. Id.
167. Parkans Int'l LLC v. Zurich Ins. Co., 299 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2002).
168. Id. at 516. This policy language is almost identical to that considered in Travelers
Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Baptist Health System, 313 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2002),
where a similar result was reached in the context of negotiable instruments. See supra note
108.





ing under Chapters 2, 4, and 5.172 Tri-State Chemicals, Inc. v. Western
Organics, Inc.,173 a consignment case, provides an interesting fact situa-
tion illustrating some of the changes made by revised Chapter 9 in regard
to consignments.
In Tri-State, a consignor provided goods to a consignee under an ar-
rangement in which the consignee was to sell the goods on behalf of the
consignor. The consigned goods and any proceeds from their sale were to
be kept separate from other property or funds of the consignee. In viola-
tion of the agreement, the consignee deposited proceeds in its general
operating account and, from time to time, used those proceeds to
purchase equipment or other assets for use by the consignee. Approxi-
mately two years after the consignment relationship began, the consignee
sold its entire business to a purchaser. Because the consignor had not
been paid for all of the consigned goods, it sued the purchaser to recover
the shortfall. The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the arrangement
between the parties was a "true" consignment and not merely a consign-
ment intended to create a security interest.1 74 Because this was a true
consignment, an action by the consignor to recover the value of its prop-
erty would lie. The purchaser responded by arguing that title to the con-
signed goods vested in the consignee by virtue of the former section
2.326, and that the consignee therefore acquired title to the goods and
their proceeds when it purchased the business.175 The court disagreed,
pointing out that the protections of the former section 2.326 applied to
creditors of the consignor, not to purchasers. 176 The purchaser further
argued that proceeds from the sale of consigned goods could not be
traced to its hands. The court noted, however, that deposition testimony
by the president of the consignee provided some basis for tracing the pro-
ceeds to various assets purchased by the consignee. 177 Because this was
an appeal from a summary judgment granted in favor of the purchaser,
the court concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the purchaser was a creditor of the consignee and whether the
proceeds could be adequately traced.' 78
172. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109(a) (Vernon 2002).
173. Tri-State Chems, Inc. v. W. Organics, Inc., 83 S.W.3d 189 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
2002, pet. denied).
174. Id. at 197. This determination was important because the former Chapter 9 only
applied to transactions "intended to create a security interest." See the former TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 9.102(a)(1) (Vernon 1994).
175. Tri-State Chems., Inc., 83 S.W.3d at 197-98. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.326(c) (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2003) formerly protected creditors of a consignee from
claims by the consignor unless the consignee was generally known by either reputation or
sign posting to be selling consigned goods or the consignor filed a financing statement
under Chapter 9. Because revised Chapter 9 now covers most commercial consignments,
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.326 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2003) no longer contains
these provisions.





Analyzing this fact situation under revised Chapter 9 reveals some im-
portant changes. First, the former Chapter 9 covered consignments in-
tended to create a security interest, but it did not cover true
consignments. 179 This rule has now been changed, and Chapter 9 applies
to consignments generally.'80 Revised Chapter 9 now clarifies the rights
of "creditors" and "purchasers" vis-d-vis a consignee in section 9.319.181
The Comment to this section notes that the revision "to a considerable
extent reformulates the former law ... without changing the results."'1 82
Under revised Chapter 9, the inquiry as to whether the case involved a
creditor or a purchaser still seems to be relevant. There is, however, one
179. See former TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.102(a) (Vernon 1994).
180. There are modest exceptions to the coverage of revised Chapter 9 in regard to
consignments. Section 9.102(a)(20) (Vernon 2002) defines a consignment as:
"Consignment" means a transaction, regardless of its form, in which a person
delivers goods to a merchant for the purpose of sale and:(A) the merchant:
(i) deals in goods of that kind under a name other than the name of
the person making delivery;
(ii) is not an auctioneer; and
(iii) is not generally known by its creditors to be substantially en-
gaged in selling the goods of others;
(B) with respect to each delivery, the aggregate value of the goods is
$1,000 or more at the time of delivery;
(C) the goods are not consumer goods immediately before delivery;
(D) the transaction does not create a security interest that secures an obli-
gation; and
(E) the transaction does not involve delivery of a work of art to an art
dealer, as provided by Chapter 2101, Occupations Code.
Under this definition, certain transactions, e.g., consumer goods, goods valued at less than
$1000 per delivery, and works of art, are not "consignments" and would not be covered by
Chapter 9.
181. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.319 (Vernon 2002) now provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (b), for purposes of deter-
mining the rights of creditors of, and purchasers for value of goods from, a
consignee, while the goods are in the possession of the consignee, the con-
signee is deemed to have rights and title to the goods identical to those the
consignor had or had power to transfer.
(b) For purposes of determining the rights of a creditor of a consignee, law
other than this chapter determines the rights and title of a consignee while
goods are in the consignee's possession if, under this subchapter, a perfected
security interest held by the consignor would have priority over the rights of
the creditor.
182. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.319 cmt. 2 (Vernon 2002), 2 which states in
part:
Insofar as creditors of the consignee are concerned, this Article to a consid-
erable extent reformulates the former law, which appeared in former Sec-
tions 2-326 and 9-114, without changing the results. However, neither Article
2 nor former Article 9 specifically addresses the rights of non-ordinary
course buyers from the consignee. Former Section 9-114 contained priority
rules applicable to security interests in consigned goods. Under this Article,
the priority rules for purchase-money security interests in inventory apply to
consignments. See Section 9-103(d). Accordingly, a special section containing
priority rules for consignments no longer is needed. Section 9-317 determines
whether the rights of a judicial lien creditor are senior to the interest of the
consignor, Sections 9-322 and 9-324 govern competing security interests in
consigned goods, and Sections 9-317, 9-315, and 9-320 determine whether a
buyer takes free of the consignor's interest.
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difference that may change the result in a case like Tri-State. Because of
the expanded coverage of consignments in revised Chapter 9, it now ap-
pears critical to determine whether the consignor filed a financing state-
ment showing its consignment interest. This is so because revised section
9.317 allows a non-ordinary course buyer to take free of a security inter-
est (which includes a consignment under the revision) if the buyer gives
value and receives delivery without knowledge of the security interest
before it is perfected. 183 Although the consignment agreement in Tri-
State permitted the consignor to file a financing statement, there is no
indication in the opinion as to whether it actually did so. The revision,
therefore, would inject a new issue into the case.
B. CREATION OF SECURITY INTEREST
Van Hattem v. Dublin National BankI8 4nicely illustrates the importance
of having a proper description in both a security agreement and a related
financing statement. In Van Hattem, a husband signed a promissory note
and security agreement granting a security interest to Creditor 1 in "dairy
cows owned by [husband and wife]." 185 A financing statement was filed
describing the collateral as "ALL farm products, inventories, accounts re-
ceivable and livestock (including all increases and supplies) including but
not limited to all livestock, now owned or hereafter acquired, and all pro-
ceeds thereof." 186 The wife did not sign the note, the security agreement,
or the financing statement. Husband and wife subsequently borrowed
money from Creditor 2 and granted a security interest in all dairy cattle
then owned or thereafter acquired by them. Both husband and wife
signed the documents for this loan without listing the prior security inter-
est on their financial statement.
Some two years later, the debtors sold their dairy herd at auction.
Creditor 2 did not know that this sale was to occur but, after the sale, was
contacted by the auction house for instructions on how the proceeds were
to be distributed. Creditor 2 instructed the auction house to issue three
checks made jointly payable to husband and Creditor 2. All three checks
were indorsed by husband, and he delivered them to Creditor 2. At that
time, Creditor 2 had no knowledge of the prior debt owed to Creditor 1.
The amount of the checks was credited to the debt owed to Creditor 2.
After learning that Creditor 2 had the proceeds of the sale, Creditor 1
sued Creditor 2 for conversion. 1 7
The court held that, even if the security agreement was enforceable
against both husband and wife on the theory that the property was joint
management community property, there was a discrepancy between the
183. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.317(c) (Vernon 2002).
184. Van Hattem v. Dublin Nat'l Bank, No. 4:01-CV-0706-A, 2002 WL 245981 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 15, 2002) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d).
185. Id. at *2.
186. Id. at *3.
187. Id. at "1.
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narrow description in the security agreement and the broader description
in the financing statement. 188 Given this discrepancy, the description in
the security agreement controlled, and the security interest was limited to
cattle owned at the time the security interest was created. 189 Creditor 1
was not entitled to recover, therefore, because there was no showing that
the cattle sold by the debtors were the ones covered by the security
agreement. 190 Even if such a showing had been made, the court went on
to hold that, because of the lack of knowledge on the part of Creditor 2
about Creditor l's interest in the cattle, Creditor 2 would qualify as a
holder in due course of the checks issued as proceeds of the sale and
would be entitled to priority under section 9.309 of the former Chapter
9.191 Summary judgment was granted in favor of Creditor 2.192
C. PERFECTION AND PRIORITY
In In re Stage Stores, Inc.,193 a finance lessor (creditor) purchased an
airplane and leased it back to a debtor. The lease was recorded with the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to show the respective interests
of the lessor and lessee in the airplane. 194 The debtor also used the air-
plane as collateral to secure other obligations owed to the lessor as a
secured creditor. The security interest covering these other obligations
was perfected by filing with the Texas Secretary of State, but no addi-
tional filing was made with the FAA. 95 The debtor eventually sold the
airplane in the course of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy for more than the lease
termination value. The creditor claimed the excess sale proceeds as part
of the collateral securing the debtor's other obligations. The debtor as-
serted that the failure to make a further recording with the FAA limited
the creditor's security interest to the lease termination value.
The court awarded the excess proceeds from the sale of the airplane to
the creditor, even though the lien agreement had not been recorded with
the FAA. 196 The court reasoned that filing the lease with the FAA satis-
fied the notification requirement to alert other creditors that an alienated
interest existed in the airplane. 197 The debtor and the creditor deliber-
188. Id. at *4.
189. Id. at *3.
190. Id.
191. Id. at *5. The same result would be reached under revised Chapter 9. See TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.331 (Vernon 2002).
192. Van Hattem, 2002 WL 245981, at *5.
193. In re Stage Stores, Inc., 269 B.R. 343 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
194. The conveyance of an interest in an aircraft must be recorded with the Federal
Aviation Administration to be effective. 49 U.S.C. § 44107 (2000). This rule has been con-
tinued under revised Chapter 9. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109(c) (Vernon 2002).
195. Because the transaction took place before the July 1, 2001 effective date of revised
Chapter 9, filing was made under the former TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.402
(Vernon 1994). Under the transition provisions of revised Chapter 9, earlier filings remain
effective until their usual lapse date. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.705(c) (Vernon
2002).




ately structured the transaction so that the creditor acquired title to the
plane and leased it to the debtor, an arrangement that the creditor relied
upon to secure the debtor's other obligations.1 98 Although the exact
amount of the debtor's obligation was not determinable at the time of
filing, the court held that "it was absolutely owed and became due once it
could be calculated."' 99 Uncertainty as to the exact amount owed did not
bar the use of excess proceeds to satisfy the other debts owed to the
creditor.2 00
Under the former Chapter 9, the proper method of perfecting a secur-
ity interest in collateral covered by a certificate of title was by notation of
the lien on the certificate. 201 This rule has been continued under revised
Chapter 9.202 Retention of this rule, however, does not resolve the con-
tinuing question of the relationship between the Certificate of Title Act
and the Code when certificated collateral is sold without an accompany-
ing transfer of the certificate of title.20 3 In Arcadia Financial, Ltd. v.
Southwest-Tex Leasing Co., Inc.,204 a car leasing company had an arrange-
ment under which a car dealer would sell used cars that were retired from
the leasing company's fleet of vehicles. The agreement between the par-
ties was that the leasing company would deliver the cars to the dealer but
would not deliver the certificates of title until proceeds from the sale of a
vehicle were remitted to the leasing company. The car dealer sold four
cars to individual buyers. The dealer then assigned the installment sales
contracts to a finance company. The dealer failed to remit the proceeds
to the leasing company and shortly thereafter went out of business. The
finance company sued the leasing company to obtain the certificates of
title so that the finance company could perfect its security interest in the
vehicles. The Austin Court of Appeals held that because stipulated facts
showed that the sale of vehicles from the leasing company to the car
dealer was contingent upon the receipt of payment from the dealer, the
dealer did not acquire title to the vehicles when it failed to remit the
proceeds.20 5 Because the dealer never acquired title to the vehicles, it
could not transfer a security interest in them to the finance company. 206
198. Id. at 346-47.
199. Id. at 347.
200. Id.
201. This rule formerly appeared in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.302(c)(2)
(Vernon 1994).
202. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109(c)(2) (Vernon 2002).
203. This issue usually arises in regard to the sale of a motor vehicle. The Certificate of
Title Act, TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 501.0071(a) (Vernon 1999), provides, "A motor
vehicle may not be the subject of a subsequent sale unless the owner designated in the
certificate of title transfers the certificate of title at the time of the sale."
204. Arcadia Fin. Ltd. v. Southwest-Tex Leasing Co., Inc., 78 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2002, pet. denied).
205. Id. at 623-24.
206. Id. at 625. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.203(b) (Vernon 2002) requires that a




D. SATISFACTION OF SECURED CLAIM
In Foster v. Centex Capital Corp.,20 7 a debtor bought a car under a re-
tail installment contract. Before the final payment was due, the debtor
exercised his statutory right to pay the loan in full. The creditor assessed
a $25 "acquisition fee" on the debtor's payoff. The debtor sued for recov-
ery of the fee on a breach of contract theory. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the creditor.20 8 The Austin Court of Appeals held
that the $25 "acquisition fee" was permitted by the same statute that au-
thorized the debtor's pre-payment of the loan.209 Because this was a stat-
utorily authorized fee, the court ruled that the deduction of the fee from
the rebate payment was not a breach of contract and affirmed summary
judgment for the creditor.210
A cautionary note must be added concerning the $25 acquisition fee.
Under section 9.210 of revised Chapter 9, a debtor is entitled to request
an accounting or a statement of account once every six months without
charge.211 Secured parties should not mistake the $25 charge permitted
in Foster as permission to assess a charge when responding to a section
9.210 request. The fee was allowed in Foster because the debtor was actu-
ally pre-paying the loan and was not making a mere request for account-
ing under section 9.210.
E. PROCEEDINGS AFTER DEFAULT
In re Cadiz Properties, Inc.21 2 is one of the first reported cases to con-
sider some of the provisions in the revised Chapter 9 that became effec-
tive on July 1, 2001.213 The principle issue in this case was whether a
creditor had properly accepted stock in a debtor corporation in satisfac-
tion of a debt owed to the creditor to give the creditor the right to elect a
new board of directors for the debtor.214 Under revised Chapter 9, ex-
cept in consumer cases, a creditor can accept collateral in whole or partial
satisfaction of a debt.21 5 Such acceptance requires that the debtor either
consent to the arrangement in a record signed after default, or that the
207. Foster v. Centex Capital Corp., 80 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet.
denied).
208. Id. at 141.
209. Id. at 144-45. The statute in question was TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 348.119 -.121
(Vernon 1998).
210. Foster, 80 S.W.3d at 146.
211. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.210(f) (Vernon 2002).
212. In re Cadiz Props., Inc., 278 B.R. 744 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
213. Revised Chapter 9 was adopted in Texas during the 1999 legislative session to be-
come effective on July 1, 2001. See Act of June 18, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 414, § 1.01,
1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 2639. Several technical amendments were made during the 2001 legis-
lative session, but the effective date remained the same. See Act of June 13, 2001, 77th
Leg., R.S., ch. 705, §§ 1-26, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1403 (codified as TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE
ANN. §§ 9.101 -.709 (Vernon 2002)).
214. In re Cadiz Props., Inc., 278 B.R. at 745.
215. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.620(a) (Vernon 2002). In a consumer transac-
tion, the creditor may only accept collateral in full satisfaction of the debt. TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 9.620(g) (Vernon 2002).
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creditor send a notice to the debtor describing the intention to accept the
collateral in full satisfaction.216 If the debtor does not object to the pro-
posed acceptance of the collateral, the arrangement becomes final, and
the collateral becomes the property of the creditor.2 17 The requirement
that, after default, the debtor consent either by signing record or by fail-
ing to object to the creditor's retention of the collateral cannot be
waived.218 In Cadiz, the court found that the creditor had not obtained
the debtor's consent in an authenticated record and had not sent a propo-
sal to retain the collateral in satisfaction.219 Because of this failure on the
part of the creditor, the stock was never effectively transferred to the
creditor so as to permit the creditor to exercise voting rights in the stock
to elect a new board of directors of the debtor corporation. 220 The ex-
isting board of directors, therefore, could authorize the filing of a Chapter
11 bankruptcy petition. The creditor's motion to dismiss the bankruptcy
case was dismissed.221
216. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.620(a) (Vernon 2002).
217. Id. § 9.620(c) (Vernon 2002).
218. Id. § 9.602(10) (Vernon 2002).
219. In re Cadiz Props., Inc., 278 B.R. at 749.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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